Resilient water infrastructure partnerships in institutionally complex systems face challenging supply and financial risk tradeoffs

A. L. Hamilton, P. M. Reed, R. S. Gupta, H. B. Zeff & G. W. Characklis

Department of Energy, Office of Science, Earth & Environmental Systems Modeling Program Acknowledged Support: yes

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51660-8

Abstract

As regions around the world invest billions in new infrastructure to overcome increasing water scarcity, better guidance is needed to facilitate cooperative planning and investment in institutionally complex and interconnected water supply systems. This work combines detailed water resource system ensemble modeling with multiobjective intelligent search to explore infrastructure investment partnership design in the context of ongoing canal rehabilitation and groundwater banking in California. Here we demonstrate that severe tradeoffs can emerge between conflicting goals related to water supply deliveries, partnership size, and the underlying financial risks associated with cooperative infrastructure investments. We show how hydroclimatic variability and institutional complexity can create significant uncertainty in realized water supply benefits and heterogeneity in partners’ financial risks that threaten infrastructure investment partnership viability. We demonstrate how multiobjective intelligent search can design partnerships with substantially higher water supply benefits and a fraction of the financial risk compared to status quo planning processes. This work has important implications globally for efforts to use cooperative infrastructure investments to enhance the climate resilience and financial stability of water supply systems.

Caption: a Distribution of partnership sizes, colored by the type of infrastructure. b Concentration of ownership shares in each partnership, colored by the size of each partnership. c Map of water providers, colored according to the bivariate palette in e. Water providers that do not participate in any optimal tradeoff partnerships are colored white. d Non-exceedance curves showing the distribution of ownership shares (log scale) across the optimal tradeoff set for each water provider, colored according to the bivariate palette in e. e Bivariate color palette to classify each provider based on the percentage of optimal tradeoff partnerships in which it participates and its median ownership share within those partnerships.

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